Yemen’s people bear the brunt of the Huthi war

Ref: ADS-62

Summary: the Huthi offensive caught the IRG forces and the Saudis off guard and with rapid advances and the seizure of new territory it is the Yemeni people who yet again pay the price.

We thank Helen Lackner for today’s article. An expert on Yemen, Helen also works as a freelance rural development consultant with a particular interest in water, among other environmental issues. SAQI Books has published the paperback edition with new material of her Yemen In Crisis, now subtitled Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope. Her latest book is Yemen: Poverty and Conflict published by Routledge. You can find Helen’s most recent Arab Digest podcast A black eye in Yemen for the UAE here.

With the notable exception of Arab Digest, Yemen and its crisis seem only to get media attention when the global north is affected by events there, rather than addressing the issues of daily survival faced by about 35 million people struggling to cope with war, predatory political leaders on all sides, droughts and floods, creating what the UN describes as ‘one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises’. Yemen only lost the title as ‘the’ worst not because of any improvements in the dire situation Yemenis find themselves in but to even more awful conditions on the other side of the Red Sea as the Sudanese civil war rages on. The past month has witnessed some dramatic changes in the country. As we feared in our last posting, full scale war has returned, and Ansar Allah has taken control of the southern Tihama, the main military and civilian centre of Mokha and the coastal villages down to the Bab al Mandab, including islands controlling the strait itself. Currently, internationally recognised government [IRG] forces, supported by more than 1000 Saudi airstrikes, counter-attack and seek to regain the mountains controlling Mokha and the strait but the Huthis fortified by their battlefield victories show no interest in anything other than military responses.

This offensive has already added 150 000 people to the already more than 5 million displaced in the past 12 years. A further 3500 people escaped the fighting by boat and have arrived in Djibouti, almost doubling the number of Yemeni refugees there in the past decade. The ‘no war, no peace’ situation prevailing for the past four years has now been replaced by full scale fighting with both sides hoping to prevail, with no solution in sight. Already with every day of fighting the intolerable living conditions for millions of Yemenis deteriorate further.

Of the 5 million internationally displaced people [IDPs], over the years many returned home but found looted houses, destroyed workplaces and no support to re-establish their livelihoods. Others, staying with relatives in neighbouring or more remote locations, suffer overcrowding and additional pressure and stresses, both personal and for basic services like water and food. Millions are also ‘settled’ in a multiplicity of encampments, including solid constructions and tents. Marib governorate has the largest number of displaced people, almost two million, an extremely heavy burden on this governorate, with limited water and services, despite being the original hydrocarbon producing area in the country.

Taiz is one of Yemen’s most densely populated rural and urban areas. About half a million IDPs were there prior to the Huthi onslaught and their takeover of Mokha and other parts of the governorate. About 90 000 of the newly displaced are to be added to that number. Taiz governorate has been a front line throughout the war, including the city which is part controlled by the Huthis. Displaced people are actually still in war zones which may become unsafe at any moment. It is likely to remain a fighting zone for some time.

Most of the displaced report having left with their children and ‘nothing more than the clothes on their backs’, leaving behind their homes and their means of livelihood, including livestock and any food stocks they might have had. Homes have been looted and the people who stayed are already being taxed to finance the Huthi military efforts. Among the problems they face is the differential currencies in Huthi and IRG controlled areas, not to mention housing, food, water or energy.

Exacerbated by the current military situation, living conditions continue to deteriorate throughout the country. Global warming climatic emergencies have been annual features, mostly droughts and destructive floods, contributing to poverty and destitution hence increasing needs for humanitarian assistance. As is the case with the recent disaster in Nepal, Yemen contributes insignificantly to global CO₂ emissions, a mere 0.03% but suffers disproportionately from the resulting disasters.

Prior to the worsening of the crisis, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC] assessed that more than half the population in IRG controlled areas was suffering acute food insecurity,  [36 percent crisis, and 15 per cent emergency]. This is in the parts of the country which are receiving what aid is available, but the majority, about two thirds of Yemenis in the Huthi-controlled areas have had no food aid since the World Food Programme [WFP] stopped operating there in September 2025, i.e. a year ago, and have seen practically no other aid for the past two years or so. Their economy has been further damaged by the now noticeable impact of the US’s March 2025 designation of Ansar Allah as a ‘foreign terrorist organisation’. This has led most banks and enterprises to relocate to Aden due to their inability to maintain business relations with their international partners. So, in the absence of IPC survey data, it must be concluded that far more than half the 20 million under Huthi rule are in similar or worse conditions.

This new crisis for Yemenis comes at a time when years of political and economic collapse, global warming, and war have worsened poverty in a country where half the population was poor in 2014 before the war. Since then, dependence on international humanitarian aid has increased with all its positive and negative implications, affecting the prices of locally produced goods, restrictions on import of basic necessities, fuel price inflation and more. [Yemen depends on imports for 90% of its staples]. The only other reliable source of income has been remittances for those with relatives abroad. International humanitarian support became essential to survival for millions, not just the displaced. Initially this rose to significant amounts, reaching US$ 5.2bn in 2018 and USD$4.1bn in 2019, but has since dropped annually to as little as US$ 1.6 bn in 2025.

This year is likely to be even worse, with only US$ 610 million [23 per cent of the appeal] financed by late September, three quarters of the year through. Without USAID support which is entirely absent, the main contributors this year are the UK, the EU, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Canada, South Korea, Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden. Most of the funding goes to emergency food and cash distributions, followed by medical support. The top non-UN recipient this year, with close to 9% of funding is an international company Dynasafe, totally owned by a US citizen, which is involved in mine clearance, important to prevent further death and injury, but not relieving pressure on household budgets.

This year, more than 22 million Yemenis were ‘in need’ of humanitarian assistance before the current military crisis. The UN only intended to reach 12 million of them, with 9.4 million prioritised. In July the WFP supported 1.9 million of the more than 18 million in acute food insecurity. This merely shows how little is done to address the desperation of Yemenis. Remember that each one of these millions is a human being deserving a basic acceptable standard of living in secure conditions, something which – as the war shows no sign of abating – no Yemenis currently have.