Ref: ADS-59
Summary: though it is receiving little international attention the civil war has been ignited by the Huthis with implications that go well beyond the borders of Yemen.
We thank Helen Lackner for today’s article. An expert on Yemen, Helen also works as a freelance rural development consultant with a particular interest in water, among other environmental issues. SAQI Books has published the paperback edition with new material of her Yemen In Crisis, now subtitled Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope. Her latest book is Yemen: Poverty and Conflict published by Routledge. You can find Helen’s most recent Arab Digest podcast A black eye in Yemen for the UAE here.
Regardless of our and other analyses [see our posting on 20 July 26] suggesting an alternative approach, the Huthis have relaunched the civil war in Yemen. On 20 July, their military spokesman announced ‘an immediate maritime ban on Saudi maritime navigation, in accordance with the principle of “blockade for blockade.” And “we affirm the right of our people to respond to a blockade with a blockade and to answer any escalation with corresponding escalation.” Since then, they have claimed attacks on at least 8 Saudi vessels, forced 48 to divert their routes and launched 9 aerial strikes in Saudi Arabia.
Despite asserting that their actions are against Saudi Arabia, there is now a two-pronged war: a naval one against the Saudis and another on land against Internationally Recognised Government [IRG] forces. On 6 August, they launched drone and missile attacks on Marib and Hadhramaut causing more than 30 deaths. Although the Huthis have not published their own casualty figures, dozens of casualties were brought to Sana’a hospitals and reports suggest that funerals were postponed till after celebrations of the Prophet’s birthday on 25 August. Since then, drone and missile exchanges within Yemen have been almost daily causing death and destruction on Yemenis already suffering a disastrous humanitarian and economic situation.
The main fronts are Marib and Taiz. Marib, one of Yemen’s main hydrocarbon producers, was the Huthis’ prime target before the 2022 truce; it has an oil refinery and a plant producing cooking gas, and also controls the main road between Saudi Arabia and the IRG controlled areas. Taiz, with its large population and the presence of most political factions has been an active front throughout the decade. Other front are also now far more active, though on a smaller scale.
A barefoot Huthi fighter inspects the burning remains of a Saudi Akinci drone – costing over $100 million per unit – a stark illustration of high-tech Saudi military investments colliding with low-tech, persistent insurgency.Why now?
There are a number of reasons why the Huthis have chosen to renew fighting now. One, of course, relates to the US-Israeli war on Iran. Iran’s main weapon is pressure on the world hydrocarbon needs. For months, Saudi Arabia solved its problems by reviving its east-west pipeline and exporting up to 5 mb/d through Yanbu, most of it heading south via the Bab al Mandab to East Asia. Reducing this flow significantly increased the impact on world oil supplies. The Iranians announced more than once that the Bab al Mandab would also be closed, which obviously requires Huthi participation. Explicit support for Iran is unpopular domestically. By contrast, attacking Saudi Arabia is justified as that regime has been described for more than a decade as the occupying enemy, a slogan which resonates with many Yemenis.
The ‘blockade’ on Huthi areas is in force since 2015 and nowadays involves limited restrictions on maritime traffic to the Hodeida ports but fully applies to the airspace. The Huthis can blame it for shortages of basic imported supplies. Saudi control of Yemen’s air space was challenged in July by two flights from Iran, the first took a Huthi delegation to attend Ayatollah Khamenei’s funeral. The return flight was prevented from landing by Saudi/IRG bombing the runway of Sana’a airport, forcing diversion of the flight to Hodeida where it was not prevented from landing.
There are many other reasons for the Huthis to act now. An important one is the threat to Huthi-Saudi negotiations from the strengthening Saudi-IRG relationship, following events in the IRG area earlier this year. The Saudis are providing the restructured IRG military with more and better materiel and munitions. Should the Saudis fully commit to supporting the IRG and cease to negotiate with the Huthis, this would end Huthi plans for substantial financial concessions from the Saudis.
Indeed, the Huthis are facing a grave financial and economic crisis. Not only have 12 years of war collapsed the economy but their designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by Trump in March 2025 is now showing results. Most banks and larger enterprises have moved to the IRG’s provisional capital in Aden and international transactions are even more difficult than earlier.
Popular suffering is deepened by the complete halt of aid from the World Food Programme since September 2025, and the very considerable reduction of other humanitarian support. This is due to the ending of USAID support, severe cuts on other aid, and the international response to the Huthis’ now lasting detention of 73 UN and international NGO humanitarian staff. As a further insult to the UN, the Huthis are currently putting on trial a WHO staff member involved in vaccination programmes, under the absurd accusation that vaccines are espionage tools. The disastrous impact on the population is worse in Huthi-controlled areas, but even in IRG areas where aid is distributed, two thirds of the population are going hungry.
For the Huthis, the restructuring of the IRG following the January defeat of the Southern Transitional Council is both constraint and opportunity. Although still divided, the IRG is a greater threat, its better equipped military under a single command, and units re-deployed to isolate separatist elements. The opportunity arises from the lasting Saudi-Emirati rift which now involves the STC discouraging its supporters from fighting against the Huthis. The Emiratis themselves, under the pretext of trying to detach the Huthis from Iran, have offered to cooperate with them. Abu Dhabi appears to prioritise rivalry with Saudi Arabia over Gulf solidarity in the face of the Iran War.
So what are the prospects?
Throughout Yemen, there is a widespread perception that ‘no war, no peace’ is no longer sustainable. IRG claims of retaking Sana’a are clearly premature. Given the choice, there is little doubt that the IRG would not have chosen to renew fighting now, wanting more time for preparation and consolidation. Although IRG forces are in better shape than in the past, the Huthis are still stronger militarily, though certainly also gradually weakening from the domestic crisis and due to reduced deliveries of high tech military materiel.
For the IRG, Saudi support is double edged, clearly needed but financial and military dependence is a weakness. Recent new Saudi institutions, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement and the 14 state Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance, are unlikely to have any rapid impact on the Yemen war. Despite his efforts to revive it, the UN Special Envoy’s 2023 ‘road map’ is not on anyone’s urgent agenda. Meanwhile, Iran’s reported demand that solving the Yemen conflict is part of the requirements to end the blockade on the Strait of Hormuz brings the Huthi-IRG conflict to the heart of the overall regional conflict.