Are the Huthis on the warpath?

Ref: ADS-57

Summary: escalation in the war between the US and Iran is set against a developing and dangerous situation in Yemen with the outlook for a return to full scale war there a growing possibility.

We thank Helen Lackner for today’s article. An expert on Yemen, Helen also works as a freelance rural development consultant with a particular interest in water, among other environmental issues. SAQI Books has published the paperback edition with new material of her Yemen In Crisis, now subtitled Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope. It is a seminal study of the war: what lies behind it and what needs to happen for it to finally end. Her latest book is Yemen: Poverty and Conflict published by Routledge. You can find Helen’s most recent Arab Digest podcast A black eye in Yemen for the UAE here.

With the renewal of fighting in the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian threats to involve their Huthi allies in closing the Bab al Mandab, the situation in Yemen is ominous. Numerous other tensions are worsening, suggesting that the ‘no war no peace’ status prevailing since 2022 is no longer sustainable.

Military aspects

Following years of ongoing low-level clashes, in recent weeks both the internationally recognised government [IRG] and the Huthis have been mobilising forces far more aggressively than at any time since the 2022 truce, sending reinforcements to all fronts. Noticeable more serious clashes took place in the southern Tihama in the first week of July, causing dozens of casualties on both sides. The Huthis have also created a new force modelled on the Iranian Basij militia, the ‘Mobilisation Forces, a parallel structure designed to organise recruitment and maintain combat readiness outside its conventional military formations’.

On the IRG side, since the exclusion of the Southern Transitional Council [STC] from the Presidential Leadership Council [PLC] in January, and the formation of a new government, the IRG supported by Saudi military advisors has been restructuring their forces, appointing new leaderships, moving units around the country and holding planning meetings of senior military leaders. The IRG’s military chief of staff claimed in mid-July that 80 percent of the restructuring has been achieved. These moves alongside a series of government instructions ordering increased military readiness also suggest preparations for possible hostilities.

Fighting has not broken out in Marib, but a major tribal mobilization in neighbouring Jawf is also cause for concern should this tribal assembly be supported by the Saudis and/or the IRG to launch an offensive against the Huthis.  However, regardless of these moves, IRG forces are still insufficiently coordinated and organised to be effective against the Huthis, a possible reason why no action has yet been taken.

Iranian civilian flights to Huthi controlled Yemen

For the first time in a decade, on 3 July, an Iranian plane landed in Sana’a airport, supposedly to evacuate medical cases though few were noticed. It did convey a large Huthi delegation to Tehran for the funeral of Supreme Leader Khamenei. The flight caused outrage in the IRG who denounced the “flagrant violation of the Yemeni republic’s sovereignty… undermining of international laws and United Nations Security Council resolutions… a dangerous threat to Yemeni and regional security.” Apparently Saudi air force planes attempted to prevent its landing leading to further threats from the Huthis.

The IRG-called meeting of the UNSC on Monday 13 July condemned the flights and expressed support for the IRG. It took place within hours of the return flight which landed in Hodeida after the IRG used drones to make the runway at Sana’a airport inoperative. In response the Huthis immediately launched drones and missiles against the southern Saudi airport of Abha not leading to any retaliation.

Huthi discourse describes these flights as integral to ending the blockades on the areas under their control. A further Iranian flight on 18 July was forced to turn back after the IRG forbade its travel in Yemeni airspace. Focus on access to Sana’a airport is now a significant issue. A possible solution may be the renewal of other flights to Sana’a. On 17 July, Jordan announced an agreement to resume flights between Sana’a and Amman, a move welcomed by the Saudis, the UN Special envoy, and the international community.

Threatening Saudi Arabia

The Huthi threats against Saudi Arabia are unprecedented. While in Tehran, a senior leader, Mohammed al Bukhaiti replaced the usual Huthi rhetoric describing the IRG as Saudi mercenaries with direct threats against Saudi Arabia. He said they would not attack Yemeni forces who did not participate in fighting. His hint that the STC might support the Huthis was confirmed by the STC statement that ‘the Southern Armed Forces Command categorically denies issuing any statement regarding participation in any military operations against the Houthi militia.’

In his 16 July weekly television address, Supreme Huthi leader Abdul Malik al Huthi’s anger was perceptible. In addition to usual themes, such as US and Israeli aggression against Gaza, he emphasized Yemen’s independence, decried the blockades and rejected Saudi influence over Yemen, asserting that renewed military action would be responded with like for like: ‘The equation is airports for airports, ports for ports, and blockade for blockade… It has become clear that we will never accept the humiliation of our people, their enslavement, or the continuation of this suffering, injustice, and oppression against our people.’

This rhetorical escalation reflects Huthi fears and concerns. It has been clear for years that both the Huthis and the Saudi regime want to reach an agreement. However the intensification of the US-Israeli conflict with Iran has worsened the situation in two main ways: first the Saudis cannot make an agreement with the explicitly Iran-aligned Huthis as this would be interpreted as openly joining the conflict on the side of Iran. Second, the renewal of attacks in Hormuz has led to a recent Iranian threat to expand the conflict by getting the Huthis to close access to the Red Sea. It would be difficult for the Huthis to ignore such a request, despite their primary concern to reduce domestic economic difficulties through an agreement which would bring Saudi finance. The focus on Sana’a airport both addresses some social tensions and distracts from the disastrous humanitarian situation.

Among the current unlikely conundrums are the potential Saudi-Huthi agreement and a STC/Emirati covert non-aggression one with the Huthis. Both would demonstrate the rival Saudis and Emiratis aligning with Iran in the current war!

In summary, escalation and a return to full scale fighting in Yemen is more likely today than it has been since the 2022 truce. However, there are good reasons to believe that it might not happen. On the IRG side, military restructuring and consolidation have not reached a level likely to ensure victory in a full-scale confrontation against the Huthis. Saudi Arabia must take many aspects in consideration [see our posting of 21 May], not least possible Huthi attacks on its Red Sea ports, oil and other economic facilities. The fact that Iran has only rarely attacked Saudi Arabia is notable. For the Huthis, returning to full scale fighting and attacks on the Red Sea would almost certainly lead to US and Saudi air strikes, worsening the political and economic crisis suffered by the people under their rule. Although close to Iran, reaching agreement with Saudi Arabia is probably more important for the Huthis, given its immediate and direct benefits at a time of deep crisis for the people under their rule.