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Summary: both Israel and Türkiye see Syria as a prize to be grasped; for President Erdoğan as a zone of influence and economic opportunity; for the far right extremists in the Netanyahu government as an opportunity to seize territory in pursuing their vision of Greater Israel.
Today we continue our all new top ten podcasts countdown. Sitting at #2 is Aslı Aydıntaşbaş’ Syria: caught between Türkiye and Israel first podcast 8 January 2025. Earlier in the summer she reached #6 with Erdoğan plays a long game becoming our first contributor to have two top tens in a single season.
Aslı is an analyst and writer and a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institute in Washington.
When we launched the podcast five years ago we had no idea what sort of reception to expect. Now 300 podcasts later we are delighted they have been listened to a quarter of a million times by people right around the world. That response is a measure of the outstanding quality of our contributors. We are fortunate and very grateful to have them.
In today’s newsletter we publish a short excerpt from Aslı’s podcast. You can listen to the full podcast here.
What does President Erdoğan see when he looks at the changed political landscape in Syria. Does he see this as one of the really big wins of his career?
He does. I think it’s a huge win for Erdoğan and that’s how he sees it, of course. You know, there’s a very exaggerated sense of the conquest of Syria in the Turkish media landscape nowadays, particularly among Erdoğan supporters and pro–government media. And that’s wrong. Türkiye did not conquer Syria and while the downfall of the regime certainly provides huge openings and opportunities for Türkiye, Syria’s story is yet to be written. I mean by that we’re hoping the fighting phase is over. We’re hoping this country can now have an upward trajectory, that it can put its house in order, that there could be an inclusive government in Syria and so on. But it’s too early to say definitely. So yes Syria is a success story. Having said that there’s no doubt Türkiye will have enormous leverage in Syria. Russia and Iran are out and Türkiye is in. So what does it mean for Erdoğan? Personally, there’s this sort of domestic giddiness about what has happened, particularly in pro–government media. And I think that there’s no doubt Erdoğan is able to leverage this at home to say politically that we have stood on the right side of history and won. Türkiye, of course, has created its own proxy groups in Syria and has huge leverage within HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) but also among the ruling elites that have now descended on Damascus. You know it’s not just HTS but also other figures and officials and leaders of various armed groups who all have a relationship of some sort with Türkiye. So if and when Syria transitions into a more competitive electoral space, competitive political space, broadening the representation from HTS to other groups, you’re likely going to have a number of people who’ve either lived in Istanbul or negotiated with Türkiye or were vetted by Türkiye and so on. So on that level, it is a strategic win and I think Erdoğan will be able to tell his constituencies in the next election ‘we have achieved this incredible strategic shift and caused the downfall of the regime in Syria.’ Now, of course, this is all aligned with the political philosophy he has been promoting very consistently over the past decade that Türkiye needs to have a zone of influence in its immediate neighbourhood and that national security does not stop at Türkiye’s border. Therefore you have seen and you and I have discussed previously the Turkish incursion in Libya, Türkiye establishing bases in Qatar, in Somalia, various Turkish military incursions in Iraq and Syria and so on. So after the fall of the regime in Damascus, President Erdoğan gave a big speech which very much sums up his policies. And he said ‘Türkiye is bigger than Türkiye. This is our destiny.’ Some call it neo–Ottomanism. Others call it more of a desire for great or middle power status power using the current geopolitical mayhem. But one way or another, it is clear to me that he has won his bet on regime change and won big time in Syria. Now, what Türkiye has not won – and I think that will be very decisive – is the economic story. Again, we have yet to see what will happen. The Syrian economy has shrunk considerably. A significant portion of the population live below the poverty line. It is a mess, war weary and war torn and there’s a lot of work to do for reconstruction. And the question of who is going to pay for it is not yet clear. Türkiye would benefit enormously economically if it could take part in the reconstruction of Syria. And one way or another, it will, but it won’t be able to pay for it because of the economic situation in Türkiye. So in a sense Erdoğan in order to turn this strategic success into an economic one would need to find a way of working with the West and big donors, including Gulf Arabs, and position Türkiye as a big player in serious reconstruction. That’s a big one. It’s doable but it requires Ankara to keep its relations with Gulf Arab states and Europeans on an even keel.
Let us turn to Israel. You’ve got Israeli troops in Syrian territory right now. Their tanks are parked on the lawn. And surely the temptation must be – because Netanyahu is being pushed hard by his far right ministers, Smotrich and Ben-Gvir – to take Syrian territory. How dangerous is this? How volatile could that be if that particular card is laid down?
I think it’s very dangerous. And you’re right, Israel is the wild card. What just happened is quite phenomenal. Syria has just become the primary theatre of contestation between Türkiye and Israel. Whereas we know that since the beginning of the Gaza war, there’s been a diplomatic spat between Türkiye and Israel and propaganda warfare and so on and so forth. But this is now taking on a different nature, in more of a kinetic space with the Israelis, as you say, grabbing more territory, destroying whatever is left of the Syrian military but also positioning themselves diplomatically as a supporter of Syrian Kurds. And all of these three elements are problematic for Türkiye. But the last one, I think, is particularly troublesome to Ankara. I am concerned that Israel and Türkiye are moving from rivalry to an enemy status in how they perceive one another. There have been diplomatic battles. There have been spats before but this one does seem different because Türkiye and Israel see each other as real rivals and I think that it’s going to be important for Israel not to raise expectations about how much they can support Syrian Kurds and not to be provocative in how they deal with Syrian sovereignty and Syrian territory.
But are the Israelis in the mood for that?
No they’re not. They’re in a different mood. But I do hope there will be some de–escalation at some point because I think this is a very dangerous situation for everyone involved but mostly for the Kurds. Ankara now sees Israel as its primary strategic rival. We’re going to see that rivalry play out in the decisions taken by the Trump administration and I do hope that the Kurds don’t become yet another element in that rivalry, that they don’t have that target stuck on their back.