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Arab Digest editor William Law welcomes analyst and author Andreas Krieg back on the podcast to discuss the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. Both sides claim a victory but unless the ceasefire holds and until it moves into the second phase and beyond that into its third phase of full withdrawal of the IDF and the beginning of reconstruction of war-destroyed Gaza fear and anxiety will continue to stalk a fragile hope for peace.
Another enjoyable podcast, for which thank you.
I would make one point, however, which is about the role of the Golan Heights. (Israel is very keen on claiming “security” as a reason for its actions where a different reason is the true driver, the Wall being another example.) In terms of security, Israeli positions on top of the Golan Heights are in a forward slope position, and vulnerable to direct and indirect fire (as well as air attack) from the North East. By contrast, any Syrian force trying to attack down from the Golan Heights would have to echelon (shuffle) on top and then descend in single file down the steep and twisting routes to the bottom. Both their echeloning and the descent would be highly vulnerable to direct and indirect fire from an Israeli reverse slope position. Nor does a state with its own satellites and access to much of US NRO’s Imagery need to have a man on Mt Hermon staring down at Damascus with binoculars (although that is a reminder to the Syrians.) Water is also the reason why the Israelis have been so reticent to return the Sheba’a Farms to Lebanon.
Israeli possession of the Golan Heights is not an issue of physical security, but is mostly about water: back in the 1950s and 1960s, Israel was an agrarian, socialist country, in which agriculture was far more important in terms of GDP, and thus agriculturalists were politically more powerful. Control of water was therefore a major political and financial issue (which one can also see in the World Zionist Organisation’s submission to the Paris Peace Conference (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Peace_Conference_(1919%E2%80%931920)#/media/File:Palestine_claimed_by_WZO_1919.png), which sought the entire catchment area of the Sea of Galilee.) Post-1967, Israel’s water needs had three main sources, each providing about 1/3 of Israel’s water: the Coastal Aquifer (which also supplied Gaza); the Mountain Aquifer (ie the Occupied West Bank), and the Golan Heights. The centrality of water is clearly visible in the Israeli-Syrian peace talks which envisaged the Golan Heights being returned to Syria as a (demilitarised) nature reserve; the sticking point was that Hafez al-Asad wanted to “paddle his feet” in the NE quadrant of the Sea of Galilee – ie have the ability to extract water.
In the run up to the Six Day War, the Syrians had tried to divert the watershed of the Sea of Galilee (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_over_Water_(Jordan_River) which the Israelis tried to disrupt, using force. With the success of the 1967 conflict, the Israelis then controlled all that watershed. Water is now much less important in capitalist, high tech Israel, both in terms of GDP and politically: the Israelis have developed RO and drip irrigation technologies, increasing their water production and agricultural efficiency. It should thus be financially and (party) politically easier to return the Golan Heights to Syria as part of a peace deal. However, Israelis have become used to it – it is the only place that one can go ski-ing – as well as being dear to the Settler block.
On boundaries in the area, IBRU did an piece on them here https://www.durham.ac.uk/media/durham-university/research-/research-centres/ibru-centre-for-borders-research/maps-and-databases/publications-database/boundary-amp-security-bulletins/bsb8-4_eshel.pdf but it seems unlikely the Ahmad al-Shara’a who took the kunya al-Golani is likely to cede much in the way of territory.