Ref: AD-2816
Summary: Israel’s recent military setbacks against Iran and Hamas, a significant loss of international support, particularly among US Democrats, and a weakening of internal social cohesion (“asabiyyah”) within Israeli society, as well as a shift towards religious rather than pragmatic decision-making, means at 76 years old Israel is showing signs of decline and may not reach 88 years like the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem.
This content is locked
Login or Register To Unlock The Content!
An interesting piece as ever, for which thank you. A couple of thoughts:
It’s not just on the Democrat side that there is a generational divide in the US: “Young Republicans are fueling the GOP’s generational divide on Israel”. Some of that may be questioning US support specifically for Israel, and some merely general MAGA isolationism. Interestingly, there is a similar shift in Germany – Israel’s staunch defender within the EU – particularly with the rise of AfD: “Germany’s rising far-right AfD is split over Israel. Jews call party ‘a danger’ either way”. Over the next ~15 years, that’s likely to have a major impact on Western support for Israel.
On asabiyyah, there have indeed been many Israelis who did not like being down range of Iranian ballistic missiles, but there was a very rapid return of reservists scattered globally following HAMAS’s attack, most secular Jews came off their pre 07 Oct 23 protests against the Judicial Overhaul to answer their mobilisation orders, and again from their protests over the continuation of the Gaza conflict before the attacks on Iran. That suggests that asabiyyah is still reasonably strong within the Jewish Israeli population (although the success of the judicial overhaul is likely to alienate many secular Jewish Israelis.)
The West is concerned about the “theocrats” in Iran getting nuclear weapons. However, as a nuclear weapons-state – Israel – gets increasingly theocratic, even Israel’s current supporters in the West may begin to get concerned.
In addition to your points, I’d note that the characters currently in power are unusual: both Netanyahu and Trump are consummate politicians; both have been able to keep fractious coalitions together. However, both are also in their late 70s, so probably not much longer in power. Much of the future trajectory will depend on their successors, whoever they may be.
Finally, what happens if Israel does collapse? The West is unlikely to accept 7 million immigrants…
Israel’s collapse, as we have discussed before, besides being a calamity of unfathomable proportions for Jews, would lead to comprehensive changes in the entire regional system.
The current crop of Arab rulers, who have put all their eggs in the Israeli basket, would all likely go directly into history’s dustbin. Their dictatorships, installed and maintained by the West to protect Israel, would no longer be required in the same way so the potential would arise for a more normal political life to develop in the Arab world and a much improved relationship between Islam and the West.
In Palestine itself, Hamas would presumably take charge, like other successful national liberation movements. Recall the famous words of Margaret Thatcher’s spokesman, Bernard Ingham, before the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa, that anyone who believed the ANC would ever form the government there was “living in cloud cuckoo land”.
The most profound impact, however, would likely be felt in countries where Zionism is strongest, like the US, UK, Germany, Canada and Australia. There the impact would be as keenly felt as the Algerian War of Independence was in France, which dramatically reshaped the nation’s political landscape and social fabric. Algeria’s liberation led directly to a severe political crisis in France and significant political instability, including terrorist acts and an attempted coup by military personnel. Its loss marked the definitive end of the French colonial empire and the mass exodus of around 900,000 European-Algerians (pieds-noirs), for which the French government was unprepared, as well as social tensions and a sense of betrayal among the repatriates. All this should be expected in the West.
Regarding Israel’s nuclear weapons, Israel’s nuclear doctrine is famously characterised by a policy of deliberate ambiguity, often referred to as “nuclear opacity” (Hebrew – Amimut). Despite this, it is universally acknowledged that Israel possesses nuclear weapons and a sophisticated delivery capability.
The “Begin Doctrine” states that Israel will not allow any enemy state that seeks its destruction to obtain nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.
The “Samson Option”, widely discussed by analysts, refers to Israel’s ultimate deterrence strategy: the threat of massive nuclear retaliation as a “last resort” if the state faces an existential threat or is on the verge of being overrun.
While the spectre of nuclear conflict between Iran and Israel is frequently discussed and naturally evokes profound fear, it is highly improbable due to a confluence of strategic, logistical, and geopolitical factors. Firstly, the historical precedent for nuclear weapon use is unique: the U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. This sole instance occurred under very specific conditions that are entirely absent in the contemporary Middle East. Crucially, the U.S. knew with absolute certainty Japan possessed no nuclear retaliatory capability, nor did it have nuclear-armed allies. Furthermore, Japan’s insular geography limited the immediate impact of nuclear fallout on non-belligerent nations. This set of circumstances allowed for a calculated use of force without fear of direct nuclear counter-attack or widespread collateral damage.
Unlike the U.S. in 1945, neither Israel nor the U.S. can possess 100% certainty that Iran lacks latent nuclear capabilities or the capacity for rapid weaponisation, even after a conventional or nuclear strike. The mere possibility, however small, of Iranian nuclear retaliation, or the transfer of nuclear materials to proxies, transforms the risk calculus from a contained operation into a potentially suicidal gamble.
Furthermore, Iran is roughly 75 times larger than Israel. A few, or even five, atomic bombs would not destroy it. To genuinely “end” Iran through nuclear means would require an immense number of warheads, escalating the conflict to apocalyptic proportions – a highly improbable scenario.
A fundamental principle of international relations dictates that the use of a particular weapon legitimises its use against the aggressor. If Israel were to employ nuclear weapons against Iran, it would, in effect, declare that such an act is justifiable, thereby inviting nuclear retaliation against itself. With its population highly concentrated around urban centers like Tel Aviv, Israel is exceptionally vulnerable. A single nuclear weapon could cause catastrophic devastation. This imbalance in vulnerability makes a nuclear first strike by Israel a profoundly irrational and self-destructive act, particularly given the uncertainty regarding Iran’s immediate nuclear capabilities.
Besides that, Iran borders three declared nuclear powers: Pakistan, Russia, and China. Any significant nuclear attack on Iran would risk widespread radioactive contamination affecting them, as well as Arab states and Azerbaijan. It is inconceivable that these nations would remain silent or inactive in the face of such an environmental catastrophe or regional destabilisation, potentially inviting retaliatory measures or severe international condemnation that would isolate Israel globally outweighing any strategic gain.
The primary goal of Israel’s nuclear opacity and presumed arsenal, however, is deterrence – to dissuade potential adversaries from launching existential attacks by presenting an unacceptable cost. This may be one of the reasons Iran stopped the war when it did: rather than push Israel into a corner it was safer to leave Israel bloodied so it collapses politically over a period of time.
There may be a “sea change” in Democrats’ view of Israel and Palestine, but it will be a long time, if ever, before this dents AIPAC’s hold over the Congress.