1 thought on “In Yemen, the Storm Before the Storm  ”

  1. An interesting review of a useful book. However, Mr Chorin writes “the 2015 Saudi-led military intervention, one of whose immediate goals was to curb Iranian influence on Riyadh’s southern flank.”

    At the time there was no mention of Iran. Neither the letter that ARM Hadi sent to the GCC, nor their covering note to the UNSC mentions Iran (https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_217.pdf) Both are solely about reversing the Huthi “coup” against (by then former) Pres Hadi, which appears to have thrown a spanner in the works of the Sunni Arab monarchs’ attempts to install a biddable military strongman in Yemen (as they did in Egypt, and as they attempted to do in Libya) as part of their counter-Arab Spring campaign.

    As DoS reported (https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0909/S00159/cablegate-iran-in-yemen-tehrans-shadow-looms-large-but-footprint-is-small-c-ne9-01257.htm), there was little Iranian presence beforehand. However, as the campaign continued, Iran was able to increase its presence and leverage with the Huthis. The abject failure by the three Western P5 members properly to discharge their UNSC responsibilities – probably, as Ms Lackner points out, for financial reasons – has allowed Iran to establish a toe-hold where they had none: radix malorum est cupiditas.

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