Ref: AD-2968
Summary: whether or not the war in the Gulf is truly over (for now at least) it is already apparent that in absolute terms there was no ‘winner’ even though there was a clear ‘loser’.
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A good article by Alastair Newton but it should be read in conjunction with today’s Substack article by Arnaud Bertrand highlighting the tactical achievements of Iran in this war.
I wonder also what a typical Israeli citizen thinks of their current predicament. After 75 years of wars, all claiming to be victorious, an immense investment particularly from the US is this what you get? Coupled with Joe Kent’s remarks yesterday about a forthcoming war between Israel and Türkiye, is that typical Israeli citizen really happy with the result? Don’t Israelis now aspire for a long period of peace and quiet?
Prime Minister Rabin saw long term advantage in peace with the Arabs and came close to realising it, very close. He was murdered. And we see the result.
Are there no lessons for the Israeli leadership in this? Has the time come for Netanyahu to go and be replaced by someone of Rabin’s calibre? Someone who understands that dominance of the region is not achievable, particularly given everything that we have seen in this war where Israel does not seem to be a winner in any sense of the word.
I am grateful to George Kanaan for his thoughtful comment on my article. On the question of Israeli public opinion, support for the current war has slid considerably since 28 February when it was around 80 percent. Right now it is still over 50 percent (just) according to a host of polls; but the clear trend seems to suggest that Israelis are indeed tired of war. Will this change what many believe to be Bibi’s belief that he gains electorally as a war leader? I honestly don’t know. But even 50-ish percent support for the war should be enough to secure him another plurality which, given Israel’s electoral system, may well win him another term.
The Arnaud Bertrand article is indeed well worth reading. But, in my opinion, some of the points therein are questionable. In particular, while I am surely appalled at Donald Trump threatening (even ‘only’ by implication) a nuclear strike, we should consider that Iran might not have agreed to a ceasefire and talks had he not raised the stakes. By coming to the table the Iranians didn’t “fold” as such; but for the hardliners in Tehran who wanted to continue the battle and inflict yet more pain on the global economy, this was undoubtedly a step-down (for now) even if there is another side to this particular coin as Mr Kanaan points out. In short, one could argue, I believe, that Tehran and Washington both blinked. And one can hope that they will both continue to do so if/when negotiations are do get under way.
I have just watched last evening’s episode of The Economist’s ‘Insider’ webinar about the Iran/US truce, in which there were several interesting observations which bear on today’s Newsletter (which I wrote on Wednesday, in fact), as follows.
(a) While it was the consensus among the panellists that none of the belligerent parties had emerged as a ‘winner’ this was tentatively qualified with a “for now” as, with negotiations still not even started, we remain far from an actual outcome. I broadly share this caution.
(b) This being said, Nick Pelham suggested that the gas producing countries of North Africa look like being winners as net importers of gas currently buying from the Gulf turned to other sources of supply in less volatile regions – but I was less convinced by his putting Russia too in this category given the challenges Moscow is facing, including escalating Ukrainian strikes on its energy infrastructure.
(c) Consistent with what I wrote on Wednesday I totally agree with Charlotte Howard that the Iranian people are the big ‘loser’ from the war.
(d) Contrary to what I wrote (on the other hand!) the panel did not think we’d see tolls on shipping passing through the Strait, not least because of Iran’s inability to enforce payment in peacetime – unless, that is, Donald Trump agreed to tolls as part of a deal, which would further infuriate the Gulf Arabs. The consensus was that, in common with its enriched uranium, the regime in Tehran probably sees this as a bargaining chip. If this is the case and they are conceded by the Iranians as part of a deal, Mr Trump will claim a big victory; but, as Mr Pelham noted, (a) the Iranians offered to surrender the uranium before the war started, and (b) the tolls would not be there at all were it not for the war.
The point about North African gas exporters was well understood earlier this year.
The current crisis simply reinforces the point that Europe should seek a strategic dialogue with Algeria and Libya on energy.
I never imagined that history would vindicate my suggestion a few weeks after it was made.